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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to assess if and to what extent PPPs contribute to value creation for user and owner, by 
highlighting how PPP contribute to value creation in public schools in a Norwegian context. 
Little research has been found concerning PPPs contribution to value creation for user and owner. The analysis and document 
studies in this paper show that PPP compels to consideration of the life cycle, incentivises project owners to focus on output-
based specifications and indicates commitment for the contractors to deliver. In sum, this indicates that PPP is suited for public 
schools in Norway. 
 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Solheim-Kile et al. (2014), PPP type projects have existed at least since the 17th century. Broadbent 
& Laughlin (2003) argues that contemporary PPP is a product of the “New Public Management” wave that took 
place globally in the 1980s. PPPs occurred in their modern form in Norway at the end of the 90s (Eriksen et al., 
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2007). The Norwegian Parliament started a process ending in an approval of three PPP road projects in 2001. The 
use of public-private partnership (PPP) as an execution model in Norwegian public schools has increased over the 
last decade. The first example was Breimyra middle school (1998), built by a private party that still leases it entirety 
to the Bergen municipality (Sanden & Corneliussen, 2015). 
An overview (RiF, 2015) has documented the current situation in the education sector. The study establishes that 
the building stock is characterized by a maintenance backlog and unhealthy indoor air quality, forcing schools to 
shut down. Norway’s overall financial situation should contribute sufficient resources avoiding described scenarios 
– this does not, however, seem to occur. The Norwegian municipalities’ responsibilities include services, operation, 
and maintenance of public elementary schools (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2014).  Several 
measures for improving the situation have been implemented, among these PPPs. However, during the literature 
study leading up to the present paper, little research was found concerning PPPs’ contribution to value creation for 
user and owner of public schools. In order to fill part of this knowledge gap, this paper examines how and to what 
extent PPP contributes to value creation for the client and users of public schools. 
The literature review revealed that PPP is an umbrella term for several approaches. According to Clerk et al. 
(2012), establishing a simple definition is difficult. He argues that there have been several attempts to define a PPP 
(Wettenhall, 2010; Hodge & Greve, 2007, and Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001), but no consensus has been 
established. PPP means different things in different countries and cannot simply be copied, due to differences in 
framework such as culture and policies (Sillars & Kangari, 2004). Thereby, this paper seeks to identify the version 
of PPP used in public schools in Norway, and researches the benefits and challenges referred to in the literature. 
Additionally, the literature review examined the concepts of value and value creation within the context of PPPs. 
Several authors discuss these concepts within this context. However, as was the case with PPP, no final 
understanding emerged. In light of the analysis of Kelly et al. (2015), this is not surprising, given that no 
fundamental laws of value exist in the same way as the fundamental laws of physics. Spencer et al. (2002) underline 
this by stating that not only is value rarely properly defined, it is also exceptionally difficult to measure.  
The undertaking of this paper is value creation within the public school sector in Norway for both owner and 
user. The main questions we address are: 
 
x What characterize the use of PPPs within the public school sector in Norway? 
x To what extent do the use of PPPs promote value creation for both owner and user of these projects? 
2. Research methodology 
The research was carried out according to a qualitative approach, involving a literature review, a document study 
and eight semi-structured in-depth interviews from two case studies. The inherent complexity characterized by PPP 
projects limits the potential understanding using solely quantitative methods as outlined by Flyvbjerg (2006). First, 
the literature study was conducted focusing on providing theoretical background on PPP, value, and public schools. 
The keywords PPP; public schools; value creation; user; owner respectively composed the foundation of the 
review. 
Two elementary public school projects were chosen for case studies, providing data from both early design and 
operational phase. The building in case A was completed in 2008, as one of the first in public school sector using the 
modern form of PPP (Berg & Edvardsen, 2009). The building in case B was completed in 2014, ensuring data about 
PPP processes in early phase and implementation. The document studies provided an overview of the processes, and 
thereby an understanding of the effects for owner and users.  
Semi-structured in-depth interviews, with key personnel such as owner, user, and supplier respectively, were 
carried out. A main concern in the interviews was to find discrepancies from what was found in the document 
studies – and what was identified in the literature review. The research was thus designed in order to include 
different sources of data, thereby strengthening the analysis as described in Yin (2009).  In retrospect, more 
interviews with key personnel would validate the information better or even reveal new aspects of interests.  
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3. Background theory 
3.1 Characteristics of PPP (in the Norwegian schools) 
 
The term PPP gained attention when it was adopted under the British Labour government (Solheim-Kile et al. 
2004). In the UK, PPP projects were first launched as Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in 1992 (Bing et al., 2004). 
The UK government appeared to view them primarily as a way of getting infrastructure costs off the public balance 
sheet, keeping investment levels up, cutting public spending, and avoiding the constraints of public sector borrowing 
limits. According to Solheim-Kile et al. (2014) some regard PFIs as one type of PPP (HM Treasury, 2012), others 
see them as identical (OECD, 2008). The main differences between PPP and PFI are more public involvement in 
PPPs, often sharing of capital investment, and focus on collaboration (Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). KPMG (2003, 
p. 9) defines Norwegian PPP as: “A public service developed and/or operated by private (or together with public) 
where risk is divided between private and public sectors.” 
Variants of PPP tend to use different models of the Design, Build, Finance, and Operate (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2004). Torp (2004) identify three different forms of PPP within the Norwegian context. The models differ with 
respect to the degree of private involvement: 1. Design and construction, 2. Design, construction, and operate, and 3. 
Operate. This paper will focus on the PPP form where the private actor develop, own, and operate the building for a 
fixed time. In the international literature, the form is typically described as BOT-models (Build-Operate-Transfer). 
BOT-models typically contain contracts where the private sector takes primary responsibility for funding 
(financing), designing, building, and operating the project (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). Control and formal ownership 
of the project is then transferred back to the public sector after a fixed time. The payment starts when the service is 
up and running (Davies & Eustice, 2005). According to Hartmann and Honerud (2014), the participants in 
Norwegian tendering receive two alternatives for transferring: 
 
x A lease of 25 years in which the building after the contract period accrues gratuitously to the municipality. 
x A lease of 25 years in which the municipality granted the right, but not the obligation, to acquire the leased object 
to a predefined compensation, often set to PPP company's project cost. The municipality can choose to extend the 
lease by 10-15 years and then acquire the leased object to 50% of project cost. 
 
3.1.1 PPP vs traditional procurement 
 
Several researchers argue for the main differences between PPP and the traditional model, including development 
and operating. Table 1 shows a summary of the differences provided by KPMG (2003).  
 
Table 1. Differences between PPP and traditional procurement (KPMG, 2003) 
PPP Traditional 
The private sector receives overall responsibility for delivering the 
service. 
The private sector is a subcontractor of clearly specified individual 
tasks. 
The private sector may receive the responsibility to bear the risk of 
cost overruns and gain rewards 
Both financial loss and savings accrues to the public. 
The government must identify what is the buildings purpose. The public focuses on how it should be delivered. 
The private sector may receive the responsibility to finance 
development or development of the service 
Financing for construction granted by public budgets. 
Payment and financing are distributed over the entire contract 
period or life cycle of the project. 
Expenses incurred in the development and construction phase. 
Costs of construction, operation, and maintenance are closely 
interwoven. 
Investment and operating costs seen largely separately. 
 
3.2 Value and value creation 
 
According to Spencer et al. (2002), construction projects are about creation of value. Kelly et al.  (2015) 
maintain that the debate in the literature is reasonably consistent in its approach to the different perspectives of 
value. The consistency allows a reasonably robust understanding of the perspective as: intrinsic value, extrinsic 
value, instrumental value, contributory value. 
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Zimmerman (2008) argues for a rough understanding of intrinsic value. He implies that an object obtains 
intrinsic value as a value that something has “in itself”, “for its own sake”, “as such” or “in its own right”. 
According to Kelly et al. (2015) the object’s intrinsic value is judged based upon the totality of the predetermined 
facets, leading them to the conclusion that intrinsic value can be anticipated before an object is chosen or a design 
commenced. Therefore, it can be argued that the right facets needed for a building are possible to derive before 
construction. Extrinsic value does not come into play until the object exists (Kelly et al. 2015). Wagner (1999) states 
that the pleasure derived from the object itself defines extrinsic value. Audi (1999) introduced the concept of 
contributory value where the setting enhances the value of the object.  Kelly et al. (2015) claims that instrumental 
value comes from the object or service by which the intrinsic value facets are satisfied. They state an example: If a 
sensation of speed is a facet of intrinsic value, then a sports car, speed boat, and roller coaster has instrumental 
value. Kelly et al. (2015) concludes that this is important as it confirms that intrinsic value can be anticipated in the 
absence of the means by which intrinsic value is delivered. The facets of intrinsic value can be explicitly stated as a 
specification of requirements delivered by what gives instrumental value, which could be through a wide range of 
options.  
The facets are arguably characterized by subjectivity. Liker (2012) defines value in the context of Lean 
Construction as: “What does the client want from the process?” By client, Liker includes an external (owner) and an 
internal (next phase of production). Thereby, value is defined by customers’ needs, emphasizing a challenge of the 
value concept: Subjectivity. Accordingly, value as a concept needs to be viewed in the context of which the 
definition occurred (Kelly et al. 2015).  
The literature seems thus to be reasonably coherent in that it is possible to specify a building’s valuable 
properties (facets). These facets are influenced by subjectivity, and an interpretation of the owner and users are 
necessary. Thereby, a building is valuable when it possesses the facets derived by the owner and users. Kelly et al. 
(2015) argue that whilst there is a number of varied value systems relevant for projects, at a decent level, the basic 
facets of each value system are the same: time, cost, and quality subdivided into capital cost and operation cost, 
time, esteem, flexibility, comfort, community, environment, and exchange (financial return).  
 
3.2.1 Value creation 
 
Hjelmbrekke and Klakegg (2013) refer to Bowman and Ambrosini (2010) when presenting a common ground 
for understanding value: value creation is the result of human activity – this is the only source of new value. In 
relation to organisations, activity represents the core business and the human represents the users of the building.  
The implications discussed by Spencer et al. (2002) are coherent with Bowman and Ambrosini (2010). To 
achieve value creation the building needs to comprehend the users’ wanted facets, so that the users can utilise them 
to reach goals. This creation of new value is two-dimensional, beginning with the actual design and construction of 
the asset itself. It results in the production of an asset that is exploited as a medium for an organisation to create its 
own value (Spencer et al. 2002).  
To ensure that the asset provides value for owner and users, Hjelmbrekke and Klakegg (2013) suggest the use of 
value propositions. They conclude that the propositions from each side being commensurable is a necessary 
condition for maximised value creation. Hjelmbrekke et al. (2014) argue that the concept of a value propositions 
constitutes a key to creating the possible and relevant value for money. Value for money is fundamental both to 
supplier and to the project owner.  
Common for the discussion is the focus on the use of the asset. Organisations often establishes a strategy with 
the purpose of explaining how their vision is going to be fulfilled (Hjelmbrekke & Klakegg, 2013). The literature 
implies that the users play an important role in these strategies. An approach to value creation can therefore be 
argued as the following: a building contributes to value creation by providing the best possible usability situation for 
the core business over time, in addition to meeting the demands of the owners, the property managers, and the 
society (STM 28:2012). Notably, a construction project contributes to value creation by providing the needed facets 
over time. The facets need to be described by the owner and users, and understood by the supplier.  
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3.3 Client and user  
 
The municipality of which the school belongs, is the client. The head master and teachers provide the core 
business. They deliver science of education, making them the users of the building. Additionally, the personnel 
providing the services are the users, while students at the school represent end users. Parents and different activity 
groups who use the facilities could be included as end users. The requirements provided by the school mainly 
consist of an optimal usability in the context of educational work. 
4. Potential of value creation 
Stratified according to the theoretical perspectives presented above, arguments for PPPs contribution to value 
creation are presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2. Potential of value creation 
Early design phase and implementation 
Long-term 
commitment 
A distinctive feature of the PPP approach pointed out by the literature is the long-term commitment (Leiringer 2006). 
According to Leiringer (2006), Spackman (2002) argues that most public sector clients would claim trying to accomplish 
this on all their projects, but the means for doing so is often considered to be greater within the commercial environment of 
a PPP contract than trough public sector exhortation. In traditional models in Norway, the supplier’s guaranty for the 
building expires after five years (Bustadoppføringsloven). A model that holds the supplier accountable for five years do 
not provide the same incentives as a model that holds one supplier accountable for 20-40 years. A private party who is 
responsible for the finance, design, building, and operation of the building suggest an actual whole-of-life cycle approach 
for the project. The fact that PPP models theoretically have greater means to long-term commitment seems reasonable. 
Collaborative 
working 
According to the literature, the PPP-model incentivises co-operative relationships (Difi, 2014 and Leiringer, 2006). The 
partnership should facilitate collaborative efforts between the parties (Leiringer, 2006), provided the contract period.  
Tender 
documentation 
The literature underlines the importance of understanding, communicating, and interpreting the actual needs of the owner 
and the users. A crucial mean ensuring a common ground is tender documentation. Traditional procurement models are 
often based on detailed input specifications concerning how an asset is to be constructed (Solheim-Kile et al. 2014). This is 
contrary to PPP-models, which according to the literature focus on output specifications. According to Leiringer (2006), 
this is by no means unique to PPP projects, but he argues that it is fair to state that it is used to a higher degree than on 
traditionally procured methods. The fact that the supplier owns the building theoretically ensures quality. This provides 
incentive for the public sector to specify what sort of services are to be delivered (EC, 2004). Output specifications 
incentivise the public sector to describe what sort of functions they want out of the project from the beginning (Davies & 
Eustice, 2005). Focusing on functions may lead to more involvement of the users and ensuring the correct solutions. 
Operation phase 
Operation and 
maintenance 
Payment in the PPPs is linked to performance, availability, and service outcomes over the contract period (Solheim-Kile et 
al. 2014). According to Solheim-Kile et al. (2014), in most of the Norwegian PPP projects the private actor receives 
revenue through this annuity-based payment scheme. It is argued that this payment mechanism establishes incentives for 
the contractor to deliver the services required in the manner that provides value for money (HM Treasury, 2004). Further, 
Robinson & Scott (2009) points out that the key requirement for the public sector is the continuity of a high quality 
service, and that the PPP model should provide adequate incentives. The specifications in the contracts compel the private 
actor to operate the construction optimally. If discrepancies occur payment can be withheld. Areas which are not available, 
are not rewarded. This theoretically ensures the users a functional and adjusted school for education over time. 
5. Findings and discussion 
5.1 Whole-of-life cycle focus 
 
Findings from case B indicates that the PPP model provide incentives to long-term focus. The private part 
expresses that the provided incentives ensures that it is profitable to conduct measurements like life-cycle 
calculations. The case study showed examples of different assessment and choices on technical solutions based on 
the life-cycle costs. Already in the early design phase, the private part involved the actors who manage the operation 
and maintenance of the construction. The involvement ensured solutions adapted to the operational phase. 
According to Leiringer (2006), little, if any, empirical research that supports this line of reasoning has been 
conducted. However, it seems like one of the reasons is contractors opting out. The contractors sell their shares in 
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the Project Company long before the contract’s due date. In the cases studied in this paper, the private part sold their 
single purpose vehicle to an investor seeking a safe long-term financial return. In reality, this arrangement does not 
seem to change the operating phase seen from the owner or user perspective. It is still the same private part that is 
responsible. Therefore, the findings seem to confirm that PPP contribute to a long-term commitment. 
 
5.2 Collaborative working 
 
Case B was characterised by a high degree of collaborative working, which, according to Meistad et al. (2013), 
can contribute to improve performance in the construction industry in general. Collaborative working can be 
achieved through a low level of conflict. The interviewees from both the private and the public sector expressed a 
remarkable low level of conflict during the project process. However, as Leiringer (2006) points out, it is of 
significant importance in which the contracts are written in PPPs. Case A had a higher level of specification, which 
led to more discussion during the project process. Interviewees underlined that the PPP-model provides incentives 
for the public sector to grant the private part trust in delivering facets like quality and time. In case B, the contractor 
received trust from the public sector. Findings indicate this as one of the reasons of the low level of conflict. 
Nevertheless, the public sector expressed the importance of a professional contractor. Similar levels of conflict had 
been achieved in other projects. This argues that collaborative working depends on many factors, one being the need 
of a professional contractor.  
 
5.3 Specifications of needs – tender process 
 
Findings from case B show focus on output specifications. The case study implies that the PPP-model generates 
a new role for the owner. From the traditional role as building owner, the owner now must look at the project with a 
user perspective. The case study shows that this role demands focus on usability, ensuring the owner to establish 
“what is the purpose of the building”. One interviewee pointed out that they conducted special measures, like 
seminars and role-play, before producing the tender documents to ensure an early focus on assessing the services 
and functions of the building. 
Interviews indicate consensus about the level of specification needed in the tender documentation. They are in 
accordance with the findings presented by Solheim-Kile et al. (2014): dialogue along with lesser-detailed 
specification could encourage innovation in management, construction principles, and technical solutions. However, 
Leiringer (2006) stresses that there is not likely to be any innovation unless there is a common ground with the 
meaning of the term and create an environment that encourages it. Case B had a very low level of detail in the 
specifications. Several interviewees pointed out that a low level is important, but not as low as in the project. Case A 
had a high level of specification. Interview showed that in retrospective, a lower level would have been preferred. 
The case studies shows some degree of innovation in form of detailed solutions in the building. However, a school 
building can be argued to provide a consistent range of use, thereby reducing the potential and need for innovation. 
We argued for a higher level of user involvement. However, neither case study nor interviews indicate this. 
Findings show that the degree of involvement contemporary is decided independently by which procurement model 
is being used. Interestingly, the study of the project process for case A did show user involvement. The result of the 
involvement provided solutions benefitting the users at a high degree. The pilot project process cannot be said to 
represent the contemporary processes in that municipality. Still, it indicates benefits occurring with user 
involvement early in the project’s life. 
 
5.4 Operation and maintenance 
 
 The case studies confirm the discussed payment scheme, which is based on access and quality measurements. In 
both cases, the private part receives a payment stream split in two – investment lease and maintenance/operation 
lease. According to Robinson & Scott (2009), a PPP project theoretically ought only to accept one payment stream. 
Solheim-Kile et al. (2014) concur, and argue that in most of Norwegian PPPs the investment lease is fixed. 
Therefore, it is not possible for the public sector to retain it if the private part is not able to deliver expected quality. 
This could weaken the provided incentives. Our findings are in accordance with both Robinson and Scott (2009) and 
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Solheim-Kile et al. (2014). It seems like the payment mechanism is crucial for the contract to contribute to value 
creation. Findings from case A show that the contract provides the public sector to retain five percent of the 
investment lease, as well as the operational lease. The contractor underlined in the interview that this establishes a 
strong incentive to deliver the services required. They express that a detainment of payment leads to big 
consequences.  
Further findings from the interviewed users indicate that the contract in case A ensures a functional school with 
expected services delivered. The users describe a situation where they can focus on education, not needing to worry 
about operational aspects or indoor climate. Reports from the municipality confirm the situation. These findings 
indicate contribution to value creation. However, in many ways traditional models could provide the same 
deliveries, but in our opinion, the main difference is the incentives provided by the PPP model. The result is a school 
that potentially provide the best possible usability situation for the core business over time.  However, document 
study shows that in case B the payment mechanism is replaced with a guarantee clausal. This clausal is argued to be 
sufficient. Based on the argumentation it can be questioned if this payment scheme provides adequate incentives. 
An important process in the operational phase is maintenance. Findings from the interviews show a process 
including meetings between the users and management technician every second week. This is supplemented with 
three meetings a year between the users, municipality, and the property management. The agenda of the meetings is 
to discuss and agree upon a necessary maintenance plan. It cannot be argued that these arrangements are exclusive 
for PPP model. However, the PPP model provides continuity and, as argued, the payment mechanism ensures the 
users a functional school building throughout the agreed period.  
 
5.5 End of the contract 
 
Based on the contractual provisions the municipality accrues the building gratuitously, or is granted the right to 
acquire the object for a predefined compensation. The period is typically 25 years, which raises the question in 
which condition the building is required at the end of the contract. The public sector in case A expressed concerns 
regarding the lack of specifications in this matter. However, they pointed out that as a long as the private part keep 
delivering service with the same quality throughout the period, no conflict will occur. Findings from case B show 
that the contractual provision states that the building is required to deliver a functional condition degree one (CD1), 
according to NS3424 (Standards Norway, 2012). A functional condition degree one is achieved when the function of 
the object or building component is intact.  
The findings from the interviews indicate that the involved parties expect few conflicts at the acquisition of the 
building. Since none of the PPP projects in the education sector have been terminated yet, data confirming this is 
unavailable. However, based on the interviews this is an element of uncertainty. Standards and regulations are 
evolving. It is difficult to derive what a functional CD1 implies in 15 years.     
  
5.6 PPP and schools 
 
The findings in this paper indicate that the PPP model actually provides the incentives discussed in the literature. 
It can be argued that one reason for this is the clearly defined service delivery and easily defined performance 
measures in the contract (OECD, 2008). The school sector seems highly suited for PPP. A restricting is that 
Norway’s financial situation does not apply for PPPs initial purpose of realising project with limited resources 
(Lædre, 2009). Nevertheless, in our opinion, the PPP model should none the less be considered, in particular due to 
the incentives it provides for the operational phase. We recommend an approach where the municipality obtains a 
portfolio including PPP contracts and traditional contracts. This could provide an opportunity for benchmarking the 
operation of the schools. Comparing them allows the municipality to learn and optimize their operation. The process 
ultimately could provide the users the best possible usability. 
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6. Conclusion 
The literature shows incentives provided by PPP contributing to value creation for owner and users of public 
schools. Findings show that these incentives to some extent occur in practice. The case studies presented in this 
paper show focus on output specification and low-level detail in the projects. Little indication on user involvement 
has been found. Indications that the contractor considers whole-of-life cycle were, however, found. The case studies 
illustrated clearly that the payment mechanism is critical for the incentives. Further, the study shows collaborative 
working and a low level of conflict. However, inadequate contract specifications concerning take-over of the 
building at the end of the contract, have a significant conflict generating potential. 
Our main conclusion is that PPP is suited for public schools in Norway. However, the findings of these case 
studies signify the need for further empirical research that allows for comparing case study findings.  
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